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ABSTRACT  
 
 The Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (HVBP), created by Section 3001 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act passed in 2010, enacted a major 
industry shift in Medicare towards “pay for performance,” or paying for high marks on a 
variety quality metrics rather than the traditional reliance on volume of care delivered.   
This study examines one of these quality metrics in particular: patient satisfaction.  The 
trajectory of this paper begins with an overview of the current focus on patient 
satisfaction as a modern quality metric in American healthcare, contextualizes this 
emphasis on satisfaction within the intellectual movement of “patient-centered care,” and 
moves on to a review of the relevant scholarship that attempts to explain the numerous 
determinants of patient satisfaction scores (with special attention to the inpatient hospital 
setting), as well as the robust academic debate over whether satisfaction is even an 
appropriate quality metric at all relative to clinical outcomes in care.  The second half of 
my discourse moves on to more practical applications – first I break down the Hospital  
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey and the 
impact of its methodology on providers, then the Medicare HVBP program itself and its 
  v 
various directions towards the value-based care model.  I conclude with a quantitative 
analysis of trends in patient satisfaction over time between 1) HVBP-participating 
providers (as of FY2014) and 2) those providers who have not opted in (including those 
ineligible to do so).  My comparison aims to study the strength of the HVBP incentives to 
improve patient satisfaction in those subject to the financial incentive relative to those 
who are not.  Additionally, I preface this analysis whether patient satisfaction scores are 
associated with either clinical process of care scores or outcome scores in the HVBP 
program. My research questions aim to shed light on the academic debate between patient 
satisfaction and more traditional clinical outcomes – are they related in the context of 
FY2014 HVBP? Are the new incentives to improve patient satisfaction actually doing so 
in a meaningful way among providers newly accountable to these incentives? Finally, in 
a market defined by zero-sum resources, is there evidence that a financial incentives 
around patient satisfaction are channeling resources and by extension improvement away 
from clinical outcome performance?  I believe this last question is the true concern of 
patient satisfaction skeptics, and hope to address it with applicable data. 
 By providing a thorough qualitative grounding in the topic followed by current 
quantitative analysis, my goal is to create an informed perspective on the use of patient 
satisfaction as a quality metric in U.S. healthcare, which can be applied meaningfully 
from policy, provider, and consumer vantage points.  With patient satisfaction becoming 
increasingly more internalized in the value-based care model, these analyses of the initial 
results in HVBP potentially serve as predictive insight into provider behavior in this area 
moving forward.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, passed by Congress and signed 
by President Obama in March 2010, targeted a variety of market failures within the 
United States healthcare system – including the incentive structures dealing with how 
care is delivered and paid for in this country.  Often overlooked by media coverage and 
political discourse that favors a focus on more controversial elements such as the 
individual insurance mandate or the Medicaid expansion, payment reform in the ACA – 
specifically introducing quality incentives amounts to a significant paradigm shift in the 
way healthcare is structured, financed, evaluated, and conceptualized in the United 
States.  The purpose of this paper is to examine the sphere of quality that is derived from 
the perspective of the patient, perhaps an unexpected concept for many given the 
complexity of the healthcare system and its historical opaqueness when it comes to 
consumer evaluation of quality.   Regardless of how well a patient is informed about the 
policy shift involving these quality measures, their individual experience in the care 
setting now plays a more prominent role in a provider’s bottom line than ever before.   
 While heralded as a major step towards cost-sustainable and quality healthcare, an 
important point of controversy in this shift, and particularly the HVBP, has been the 
tension between quality measures reflecting clinical processes of care (i.e. the more 
traditional conception of quality) and those evaluating the patient’s experience of their 
care, namely satisfaction.  Wide disagreement has persisted whether patient experience 
care, and by extension patient satisfaction, is truly an appropriate metric for determining 
quality of care.  The Affordable Care Act made a firm choice in the affirmative – HVBP 
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structured the “Patient Experience of Care” domain as 30% of a hospital’s Total 
Performance Score (TPS) in FY2013 and subsequent years, with “Clinical Processes of 
Care” starting at 70% of TPS and in FY2014 the introduction of “Outcome” scores1.  By 
choosing to include patient experience of care in the incentive equation, the results from 
HVBP participation allow us an opportunity to revisit this debate over the 
appropriateness of patient satisfaction in a quality setting, using real-life providers for the 
first time. 
 I aim to examine the trends in patient satisfaction both before and since the 
implementation of these new incentives for experience of care – whether patients are in 
fact reporting higher satisfaction in their care, whether these gains are vary significantly 
between providers who opted into HVBP during FY2014 versus those that did not, and 
also examine whether scores in the patient experience of care domain bear any 
relationship to those of clinical processes of care and outcomes.  My quantitative analysis 
will also look at improvement in patient satisfaction relative to improvement in outcomes 
between pre-ACA and the most recent quarter of reported data in the aim of looking at 
whether improvement in satisfaction and improvement in clinical outcomes is a zero-sum 
game as skeptics fear.  Examining this provider data, I hope revisit and further inform 
this debate as hospitals begin their journey into “pay-for-performance” quality incentives.   
 
                                                
1 The “Efficiency” Domain will be added in FY2015 and subsequent years focusing on cost. 
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PATIENT SATISFACTION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES  
 
 
 Though patient satisfaction is a both a quantifiable and standardized variable 
according to the purposes of our research question, it is critical to discuss the theoretical 
background of patient satisfaction in the context of the movement towards patient-
centered care.  Several questions arise when thinking about patient satisfaction as a 
variable in social science, first of all what is it? What are its determinants? What are the 
implications for caregivers and delivery of healthcare if and when it’s incorporated into 
the incentive structure for providers? Does higher satisfaction really lead to better health 
outcomes for patients, e.g. is a consumerist model a good thing for healthcare? Is it an 
appropriate metric to include in a value based, “pay-for-performance” incentive 
structure?  Are patients really informed enough to be able to recognize quality care when 
they receive it, and when they don’t?  These are questions that the relevant scholarship 
has engaged in, and certain opinions on the answers to these questions have successfully 
wound their way into the policy debate, including the Affordable Care Act.   I aim here to 
present and summarize the scholarship relating to patient satisfaction in the interest of 
providing a meaningful context for current policy regarding this metric.   
 Various scholars point to a range of salient factor in determining the sources of 
patient satisfaction.  Foremost among these views are the prior expectations of a patient 
entering the care setting (Thompson & Suñol), (Thiedke), demographics such as age, 
gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and health status (Thiedke), attention to patients’ 
religious and spiritual concerns (Williams et al.), the communicative ability of the 
physician referred to as “physician-patient communication” or “patient-centered 
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communication” (Epstein), (Kaplan et al.), (Olson et al.) and finally the traditional view 
that satisfaction is exclusively a function of clinical quality in outcomes (O’Toole et al.).  
These theoretical perspectives collectively contrast with the practical – that is, the 
elements that are actually included in the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare 
Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey which are used to determine the Patient 
Experience of Care score for hospitals participating in HVBP.  I’ll examine here the 
theoretical perspectives that have played major roles in the scholarship involving patient 
satisfaction, and later will keep these perspectives in mind when breaking down the 
specific components that make up the HCAHPS survey, which in terms of policy 
application serves as the “official” definition of patient satisfaction endorsed in the 
Affordable Care Act/used by HVBP.   
 Broadly surveying the literature, patient expectations are complex and involve a 
variety of psychological, sociological, market theory, and time-series (encompassing the 
“before”, “during”, and “after” of care) considerations that vary in weight depending on 
the scholar, type of care setting, and arguably the individual patient (Thiedke 2007). 
Thiedke, a professor of family medicine at the Medical University of South Carolina, 
reflects on the two-plus decades of literature on the topic as a consistent struggle to come 
to a universally standard accepted definition of satisfaction in healthcare.  Even with the 
HCAHPS methodology fully transparent and publicly vetted, this lack of 
theoretical/foundational consensus creates uncertainty into what exactly at the end of the 
day is being measured in a patient satisfaction survey.  While concluding that what’s 
ultimately being measured is a combination of prior expectations, experience during the 
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care visit, and post-visit resolution of symptoms (a rather comprehensive view relative to 
other scholars), Professor Thiedke’s most compelling contribution to the theory of patient 
satisfaction is a breakdown of determinant factors across three spheres of control: patient-
related factors, physician-related factors, and system-related factors (a particularly 
interesting and impactful category given our focus on inpatient hospitals, which are 
increasingly part of larger health systems).  I outline them here: 
 
Patient-related factors: Age, Ethnicity, Gender, Socioeconomic status, Health status 
 
Physician-related factors: Expectations, Communication, Control, Decision-making,  
           Time spent, Technical skills, Appearance 
 
System-related factors:  The clinical team, Referrals, Continuity of care 
 
(Thiedke 2007) 
 
 
Equipped with multiple decades of experimental and survey literature, this categorical 
ordering provides us with a broad picture of the various determinant factors that scholars 
have concluded play a role in satisfaction to varying degrees.  
 How do these factors impact satisfaction scores? While gender studies have 
proven to be contradictory, the other demographic categorical factors featured general 
patterns (though no determinant was not without at least one study posing a possible 
caveat).  Higher age is associated with greater satisfaction, minority ethnicity is 
associated with lower satisfaction, lower socioeconomic and less education is associated 
with lower satisfaction, and poor health status (specifically those with one or more 
chronic conditions) report more hassle and lower satisfaction with care especially in 
situations where continuity in care is poor.  Though Thiedke touches on many 
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determinant areas in a broad sense, certain more primary factors warrant more extra 
attention.  An almost universally salient factor that predicts patient satisfaction is the 
expectations of the patient prior to entering the care setting, and the strength of its role in 
satisfaction has important implications for implementing P4P structures.   
 Returning to Professor Thiedke’s list, we’re given insight into several patient 
factors that are constants across care settings  – namely the demographic factors 
categorized as patient-related. Why distinguish the determinant factors that remain 
constant across care settings from the rest?  It is important to recall that the factors in 
Thiedke’s paper, while no doubt based upon diverse and collective scholarship over time, 
are articulated from the perspective of family medicine.  Nearly every author exploring 
satisfaction in healthcare cites serious challenges in standardizing a measure that 
successfully incorporates all relevant inputs into account.  Among the main challenges is 
that the settings for the delivery of care is not constant – the norms and processes found 
in primary care differ markedly from the inpatient hospital setting, which in turn are 
distinct from psychiatric hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals, home-care settings, etc.  
Determinant factors like opportunity for meaningful PCC are radically different between 
the primary care office and the ICU; the clinical teams across these care settings are 
structured differently and uniquely composed to meet specific population needs.  Where 
in primary care communication is regular and grounded in a relationship built over time, 
the majority of inpatient care is single instance with a care team that is far larger than a 
single practitioner – this has shown to greatly inhibit PCC and opportunities for patients 
to engage jointly in the decisions about their care (Olson & Windish 2010), (Arora et al. 
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2009).  When we turn to the quality debate over appropriateness of experience of care 
measures vs. strictly clinical outcomes, we’ll consider theories that apply generally as 
well to the inpatient hospital setting specifically, as it is the specific landscape for 
HCAHPS and MBVP.  When we consider the topic surveyed by HCAHPS, we’ll again 
be afforded the opportunity to consider how specific methodological choices respond to 
the unique characteristics of the inpatient hospital setting.   
 
 
 
 
THE DEBATE: DOES SATISFACTION BELONG AMONG QUALITY 
CONSIDERATIONS? 
 
 While the shift towards paying for performance (e.g. quality) enjoys broad 
industry support, a prolific debate exists over whether patient satisfaction is truly an 
appropriate indicator of quality care.  Unlike traditional consumer markets, quality in 
healthcare has long been opaque – violating traditional economic assumptions whereby 
consumers are able to judge quality and determine appropriate demand.  This has 
certainly been a salient determinant of cost escalation, but for our purposes it poses a 
potential hurdle when that same imperfect consumer judgment is used to define quality 
with the backing of financial incentives.  That being said, the debate is no longer merely a 
theoretical one – the Medicare Value-Based Purchasing Program has endorsed the 
appropriateness of taking this judgment into account by introducing the “patient 
experience of care” as a sizeable (though minority relative to clinical outcomes) factor 
into the new program.  As the quantitative section of this piece examines trends in patient 
satisfaction via the “experience of care” component of HVBP, it’s prudent to address here 
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the substantial literature, both for and against, including patient satisfaction metrics in the 
evaluation of quality care.  The debate hinges on the intersection between theory and 
practice – in an ideal world every market is naturally impacted by viable consumer 
quality judgment, and the fundamental disagreement is whether we can accurately 
produce a metric system that solves the market problem by facilitating relevant and 
meaningful quality judgments by patients.  The proponents say it can be done and already 
has been accomplished through the institutionalized HCAHPS survey.  Detractors 
contend the imperfections in this method are 1) too great, 2) do not succeed in solving the 
fundamental consumer-market problem unique to healthcare, and 3) create unnecessary 
(pertaining to quality), even perverse incentives for caregivers who are subjected to 
reimbursement schemes that employ metrics for satisfaction.   
 A worthy place to launch the “against” argument summary comes from a headline 
written by Elisabeth Rosenthal of the New York Times in late 2013 titled – “Is This a 
Hospital or a Hotel?” The piece touched lightly on the new incentives to invest in patient 
satisfaction, but painted a vivid observational portrait of several hospitals around the 
country investing massively in hospitality amenities: private rooms, luxury surroundings, 
gourmet food service, flat-screen televisions – all in an effort to increase patient demand, 
and many holding the view that patient demand is correlated much higher to these 
amenities than the clinical quality of the care.  Such a scene described in the article is the 
epitome of the fears opponents of incentivizing patient satisfaction share.  The idea that 
ultimately an emphasis on patient satisfaction will ultimately interfere with the clinical 
quality of care those patients will receive, and undermine the very notion of “patient-
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centeredness” that is given credence on both sides of the debate yet in the view of 
opponents cited inappropriately in this instance by proponents.   
 Foremost among concerns is the potential ethical dilemma created when a patient 
requests an unnecessary or otherwise inappropriate care procedure (recall that patient 
expectations are a salient, if not primary, determinant of satisfaction), and the treating 
physician finds herself choosing between satisfying the patient’s inappropriate request or 
saying no and risking a poor satisfaction score and the financial incentives that come with 
it.  This dilemma, posed by family physician and addictive medical specialist Dr. 
Aleksandra Zgierska in a 2012 American Medical News article by Kevin O’Reilly, 
captures the potential pitfalls of deferring to patients in the care process.  O’Reilly’s 
article cites numerous experimental studies that point to flaws in incentivizing 
satisfaction – among them a 2007 Annals of Internal Medicine article concluding that 
36% of physicians reported they would yield to a patient request for an MRI exam that 
was clinically unwarranted.  Though some literature would point to malpractice liability 
and the norm of “defensive medicine” as at least a partial source of this survey result, 
what’s interesting is that the study was undertaken three years before the Affordable Care 
Act was signed into law.  If not HBVP, then where are these satisfaction incentives? 
O’Reilly describes a trend preceding the ACA whereby hospitals and health systems 
employ their own internal incentive schemes.  Referencing a Hay Group report, 43% of 
these providers employed incentive schemes that included patient satisfaction metrics in 
2010, which increased by nearly half to 63% in 2011.  While MBVP standardizes both 
the measure and incentive scheme across all eligible providers, proprietary incentive 
  
10 
schemes are just as meaningful if not more likely to influence physician behavior at a 
given institution.  The conflict presented in this dilemma is how far can patient-centered 
care truly go before a physician must grab the reins back? Is it a zero-sum relationship 
where a patient’s agency comes at the cost of clinical appropriateness and vice versa, or 
can a balance be struck that preserves the values of both parties? 
 Ethical considerations aside, a more straightforward and oft-written about con in 
paying for satisfaction is the view that high patient satisfaction simply does not equate to 
a high quality in clinical outcome.  Without the aid of experimental studies we can easily 
imagine a situation where a hypothetical patient receives a completely unnecessary 
invasive medical procedure, yet is completely satisfied with their care.  Early studies into 
the question favored the “no relationship” argument with weak and consistent evidence of 
any association (Cleary & McNeil), no association between global rating of care and 
technical quality in a sample of elderly patients (Chang et al.), and more troublesome 
newer findings that higher satisfaction was associated with greater use of inpatient 
services, greater utilization of healthcare (negative from a cost control perspective), 
higher spending on prescription drugs, and increased mortality rates than those reporting 
lower satisfaction (Fenton et al.). Furthermore as briefly noted in the previous section, the 
inpatient hospital setting presents even bigger obstacles to achieving even basic 
semblances of interaction that would lead to satisfaction.  A majority of patients were 
found to lack the ability to name a single physician on their care team (Arora et al.) – 
potentially compromising a salient factor in the patient’s ability to evaluate their care 
experience.  It’s prudent to note that not all advocates who view patient satisfaction 
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metrics as unrelated to clinical quality support the exclusion of these experience of care 
measures from a pay for performance scheme.   Chang et al. conclude that quality care 
assessments should include both patient evaluations and independent clinical/technical 
assessments, joined by New York Times Best-Selling author Martin Makary of Johns 
Hopkins, who also rejects the association between patient experience and clinical quality 
but nonetheless retains the former as an important hospital priority.  Interestingly enough, 
Makary points to workplace culture in the inpatient setting as a primary determinant of 
satisfaction, which if meaningful makes for compelling implications around employer 
culture as a source of financial benefit.   
 Though much of the motivations for supporting inclusion of patient satisfaction 
metrics into quality care considerations have been discussed from the perspective of the 
patient-centered care movement, the literature also lends itself to positive implications for 
inclusion of satisfaction in performance incentives.  Higher patient satisfaction has shown 
to be associated with greater adherence to treatment regimens (Glickman et al.), and 
lower 30-day readmissions (one of the most important clinical quality measure) with high 
satisfaction in discharge planning (Boulding et al.).  While authors both for and against 
using patient satisfaction have acknowledged the inherent uncertainty in how satisfaction 
is determined and how best to measure it, none of the proponents float the idea to 
evaluate quality exclusively with experience of care measures but rather as a supporting 
category.  With the notion of patient-centeredness in mind and a diverse set of at times 
interrelated, at times conflicting perspectives regarding the sources of patient satisfaction 
and how they relate to clinical quality, we turn to the HCAHPS survey to examine the 
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concrete choices made in calculating the patient experience of care in the Medicare 
Value-Based Purchasing Program. 
 
 
THE MEDICARE VALUE-BASED PURCHASING PROGRAM (FY2014) 
 
  
 The Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (Hospital VBP or VBP) 
was established by Section 3001 of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), adding 
Section 1886(o) to the Social Security Act.   The legislation builds on past Congressional 
action in the area of quality reporting: the 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act and the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act both 
introduced mandatory transparency measures that laid the groundwork for much of what 
Hospital VBP requires and relies on in terms of quality reporting.  (Frequently Asked 
Questions Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program). 
 Hospitals participating in the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program will 
begin to receive incentive payments for providing high quality care or improving care 
after during pre-defined “Baseline Periods” which establish benchmark scores for each 
quality metric/domain, followed by a “Performance Period” during which time patient 
discharges are factored into the Total Performance Score by CMS for that particular 
fiscal year.  The FY2014 phase of the program, which is both the most recent in terms of 
public reporting and the focus of this paper’s analysis, features three categories of 
evaluation known as “domains.”  These domains are “Patient Experience of Care,” which 
is a slightly tweaked HCAHPS measure weighted at 30% of the Total Performance Score, 
“Clinical Process of Care,” which comprises several evidenced-based medical procedural 
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metrics weighted at 45% (down from 70% in FY2013), and finally an “Outcome” score 
assessing mortality rates for heart attack (acute myocardial infarction), heart failure and 
pneumonia and weighted at 25% of TPS. (Frequently Asked Questions Hospital Value-
Based Purchasing Program) While FY2014 does not yet incorporate readmission rates 
into the Outcome Domain, these are publicly reported and included in the upcoming 
analysis. 
 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS/METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Questions  
 
 In light of the academic debate surrounding the benefits versus potential pitfalls of 
including patient satisfaction in a quality score with tangible financial implications, my 
purpose here is to clarify the debate using second year data from the Hospital VBP 
program (FY2014) as well as archived HCAHPS and clinical outcomes data from before 
the passage of the Affordable Care Act. 
 The objective of my quantitative analysis is to examine, using available HCAHPS 
reporting data (as well as Domain/TPS scores for Hospital VBP-participating providers), 
patient satisfaction scores for all hospitals that engage in public reporting including 
various sizes, types, and geographic locations within the United States.  My samples of 
interest are twofold and mutually exclusive – on the one hand, I’m interested in the group 
of eligible hospitals that decided to opt into the Medicare Hospital VBP program for 
FY2014.  Second, I’m interested in the group of non-participating providers as of 
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FY2014 (N = 712), which includes both providers that are defined as ineligible under 
Hospital VBP rules2, as well as eligible providers who decided against opting into the 
program in its sophomore year.   
 
My three major research questions are as follows: 
 
 1) In the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, does the “Patient Experience 
    of Care” domain (patient satisfaction) bear any relationship to the more    
 traditionally clinical domain categories of “Outcomes” and “Clinical Process of 
 Care?” 
 
 2) Did the passage of the Affordable Care Act, specifically the provision creating  
       the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program in Medicare, lead to a   
       significant increase in patient satisfaction for those hospitals that opted in for     
       FY2014?  
 
 2) For providers who opted into Hospital VBP during FY2014, did improvement  
     in patient satisfaction come at the expense of improvement in clinical      
     outcomes?  
 
 Recall that VBP in FY2014 featured a 1.25% reduction in Medicare DRG 
payments to providers (up from 1% in FY2013), and calculated each provider’s Total 
Performance Score using three domains: Patient Experience of Care at 30%, Outcomes at 
25%, and Clinical Processes of Care at 45%3.  Critics of including patient satisfaction in a 
P4P program contend generally that satisfaction is an inappropriate quality indicator 
because of a lack of relationship to clinical outcomes; according to this viewpoint its 
inclusion would logically result in lower clinical quality scores or lower rates of clinical 
improvement than if patient satisfaction was not part of the quality equation. 
                                                
2 See Appendix C for a breakdown of provider eligibility requirements for Hospital VBP 
participation  
3 FY2013 of Hospital VBP featured a scoring scheme of Clinical Process of Care – 70%, Patient 
Experience of Care – 30% (Outcomes was not included in FY2013) 
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  Question #1 is the a straightforward baselines question before diving into 
comparisons between groups, and it is concerned exclusively with the group of Hospital 
VBP-eligible providers that opted into the program for FY2014.  Given that the Total 
Performance Score is made up of only two domains, one being patient satisfaction, the 
goal here is to answer a simple question: is there a correlation between the two? 
Additionally, I’m able to explore the relationship not only between “Patient Experience 
of Care” and “Clinical Process of Care” domains, which make up the TPS, but also the 
“Outcome” domain that is reported but not yet included in the scoring scheme for 
Hospital VBP in FY2014.  The answer to this question will provide further insight into 
the patient satisfaction inclusion debate, and nicely set up the last question of interest. 
 Question #1 is a baseline question.  Its purpose is to that aims to explore whether 
the financial incentives to increase patient satisfaction were in fact strong enough to 
effect provider improvement on that metric. It’s baseline in nature because if the 
incentives were not strong enough to encourage providers to renew their focus on 
improving their patient satisfaction scores, then it can be reasonably assumed that the 
presence of patient satisfaction in the Hospital VBP composition should bear no risk to 
improvement on more traditional quality metrics like clinical processes of care and 
outcomes (the latter metric, while consistently reported, does not make its way into 
Hospital VBP until FY2014).  This comparison will be made using   I expect there to be a 
significant finding in regards to the this question – that is, I expect a higher rate of 
improvement  
  The goal of Question #3 is to meaningfully test the concern of critics of 
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incentivizing patient satisfaction in healthcare.  That is, does incentivizing patient 
satisfaction result in either lower absolute scores in clinical outcomes or lower rates of 
improvement in those outcomes, presumably due to an unwarranted provider focus on 
patient satisfaction.  In other words, is improvement in patient satisfaction and 
improvement in clinical outcomes mutually exclusive?   We return to the two sample 
groups to test this question, operating under the assumptions that both groups (even in the 
absence of Hospital VBP financial incentives for the non-participating group) respond to 
base-level incentives to improve satisfaction and outcomes due to public reporting of and 
transparency of these satisfaction measures.   If we find that the results of Question #1 
indicate a higher level of improvement in patient satisfaction due to the VBP incentives 
(i.e. the expected result), then it will be doubly revealing to explore the same 
improvement trends in clinical outcomes between the two groups.  Should the rate of 
improvement in clinical outcomes appear to be stunted among the VBP-participating 
providers, the result could lend credence to opponents of including satisfaction.  If, 
however, outcome improvement rates are comparable or greater among the participating 
hospitals, it would likely enhance the position of those that view patient satisfaction as a 
viable indicator of quality care – a position endorsed by Congress, HHS, and CMS.     It 
should also be noted that the general assumption is that providers, due to increasing 
transparency and scientific advances, will show better clinical outcomes over time. 
 I take no official position on the merits of either side of the debate; rather, I aim to 
let the data analysis clarify the debate objectively as the industry moves from theory to 
application in P4P that includes patient satisfaction scores.   
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Data/Methodology  
 
 The primary sources of data for this study were collected from two public 
sources: The Medicare.Data.gov4 website administered by the CMS, and archived 
Hospital Compare data from the Hospital Quality Initiative section of CMS.gov.5 
 Specifically, I’ll be drawing on data from two points in time for purposes of 
comparison: July 2009, eight months before the Affordable Care Act was signed into law, 
as well as the most recent public reporting data as of March 2014.  For the quality metrics 
I’m interested in, HCAHPS Score and Outcomes, the earlier data serves as a relevant 
starting point given that it’s relatively recent yet still before the passage of the ACA.  It 
serves as a baseline given that the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program did not yet 
exist, and all providers regardless of future opt-in status shared the same incentives for 
reporting these measures in Medicare (not yet differentiated along P4P measures).  The 
most recent FY2014 data of course features the split in “control” versus “experimental” 
groups –that is the non-participating VBP group and the FY2014 VBP-participating 
group respectively.  Excluded from the analysis are providers that did not report either 
HCAHPS or Outcomes as of July 2009, in addition to providers that reported these 
measures in July 2009 but did not exist due to merger or closure by 2014.   
 Question #1 data, unlike the following too, involves FY2014 Hospital VBP-
specific scores assigned to participating providers.  While the other research questions 
focus on comparisons between VBP-participating and non-participating providers on 
                                                
4 https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare 
5 http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-
Instruments/HospitalQualityInits/HospitalCompare.html 
  
18 
(experimental and control groups, respectively) using metrics that facilitate valid 
comparisons, the sole focus here is on the experimental group.  Specifically, does the 
Patient Experience of Care score bear any relationship to the other domains? This result 
can preliminarily speak to the debate over correlation with clinical outcomes and apply it 
in a targeted way to the scoring system produced by CMS in the VBP program. 
 Whereas Question #1 uses VBP Domain scores, Questions #2 and #3 involve 
non-VBP participating providers that lack these scores; comparisons are drawn from 
“raw” HCAHPS scores and parallel clinical outcome reporting on both 30-day mortality 
and readmission measures.  These metrics are formulated as follows, beginning with 
HCAHPS/patient satisfaction followed by clinical outcomes: 
 
 HCAHPS Questions 
 
1. How often were the patients’ rooms and bathrooms kept clean? 
2. How often did nurses communicate well with patients? 
3. How often did doctors communicate well with patients? 
4. How often did patients receive help quickly from hospital staff? 
5. How often was patients’ pain well controlled? 
6. How often did staff explain about medicines before giving them to patients? 
7. Were patients given information about what to do during their recovery at 
home?* (i.e. discharge instructions) 
8. How do patients rate the hospital overall?** 
9. How often was the area around patients’ rooms kept quiet at night? 
10. Would patients recommend the hospital to friends and family?* 
 
 For seven out of ten of these questions (the exceptions are denoted with an 
asterisk, with one unique question denoted with two asterisks) the methodology for this 
analysis is what percentage of patient respondents indicated “Always” to the survey 
question – their two other options being “Usually” and “Sometimes or Never.”  While 
improvement in patient satisfaction is certainly possible moving from the “Sometimes or 
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Never” box to the “Usually” box, I focus exclusively on the percentage of “Always” 
answers as the best measure of improvement.  This is because over time I expect that 
patient satisfaction will naturally improve as best practices are discovered and 
implemented, and it allows specifically the strongest improvement to be factored into the 
quantitative analysis. 
 HCAHPS Questions #7 and #10 ask a “Yes” or “No” question, with the measure 
of improvement in this analysis being determined by the percentage of patient 
respondents indicating “Yes” in both cases.  Finally, HCAHPS Question #8 offers the 
patient respondent an interval scale from 1-10, with the sequential scoring options as “6 
or below,” “7 or 8” and “9 or 10.” For similar methodological reasons as the “Always” 
answer for the majority of HCAHPS questions, I am concerned only with the percentage 
of “9 or 10” as a measure of comparative quality improvement.  Moving onto the 
Outcome measures: 
 
 Outcome Metrics 
 
1. Heart Attack (Myocardial Infarction) – 30 Day Mortality Rate 
2. Heart Attack (Myocardial Infarction) – 30 Day Readmission Rate  
3. Heart Failure – 30 Day Mortality Rate 
4. Heart Failure – 30 Day Readmission Rate 
5. Pneumonia – 30 Day Mortality Rate 
6. Pneumonia – 30 Day Readmission Rate s 
  
 
 Due to occasional inconsistencies in reporting in terms of when individual 
providers began publicly reporting their HCAHPS and outcome performance, the sample 
sizes for Question #2 and Question #3 are slightly different.  (While P4R 
incentives/legislation has been in place since 2003, the adoption of these practices has not 
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been uniform).   Question #2 features a control sample of N = 712, that is providers who 
publicly reported their HCAHPS performance in July 2009 as well as 2014 but did not 
participate in Hospital VBP due to ineligibility or choice, and an experimental sample N 
= 2,143 of providers that both publicly reported their HCAHPS performance in July 2009 
and participated in Hospital VBP during FY2014.  Question #3 features parallel control 
and experimental groups but instead along the metric of publicly reported clinical 
outcomes, with a control group N = 1,782 and experimental group N = 1,810. 
 
 
 
RESULTS  
 
Question 1  
 
 Critics who contend patient satisfaction has no bearing on clinical outcomes seem 
to have some support for their claim in the data – Patient Experience of Care scores 
showed a very slight negative correlation (essentially amounting to zero correlation) with 
Outcome domain scores: 
 
 Outcome Domain Clinical Process of Care Domain 
Patient Experience of Care -.1038 .1127 
 
Table 1 – Patient Experience of Care Correlation 
 
The correlation coefficients for Patient Experience of Care domain scores relative to the 
Outcome and Clinical Process of Care domain in FY2014 HVBP   
 
 The correlational relationships above suggest that at least in terms of CMS 
formula scoring regarding patient satisfaction, outcomes, and clinical processes of care, 
patient satisfaction (Patient Experience of Care Domain) does not appear to bear any 
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relationship to the more “traditionally clinical” Outcome and Clinical Process of Care 
Domains.  While lending credence to the argument that patient satisfaction and clinical 
measures are not correlated in terms of Hospital VBP scoring, the next two questions 
explore the effects of Hospital VBP incentives on improvement in patient satisfaction and 
whether this incentivization on experience of care comes at the cost of quality 
improvement in clinical outcomes.   
 
 
Question 2 
 
 
 Here I’ve explored whether providers that have opted into FY2014 Hospital VBP, 
and with it incentives to improve Patient Experience of Care (HCAHPS), have in fact 
shown an improvement in satisfaction relative to the non HVBP-participating providers 
that lack those same financial incentives.  First, I start with the non-HVBP participating 
providers or “control” group: 
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Figure 1 – Non HVBP-Participating Providers HCAHPS Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – HVBP-Participating Providers HCAHPS Performance 
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Figure 3 – Average HCAHPS Improvement: Control vs. Experimental 
 
 
 
 
 As Figures 1 & 2 suggest, the two groups of providers are nearly identical when it 
comes to the various HCAHPS measures in July 2009 – eight months before the 
Affordable Care Act was signed into law and Hospital VBP in Medicare became a 
reality.  This is an important initial finding because if one group started out way ahead in 
terms of their HCAHPS results, it could lessen the impact and relevance of improvement 
comparisons over time and suggest that the groups are too dissimilar to warrant a valid 
comparison on the basis of program participation.  I do not find this to be case.  Rather, I 
expected and we see here a “level playing field” where both groups were subject to the 
same P4R incentives regarding HCAHPS prior to the Affordable Care Act.   
 Figure 3 highlights the level of change in mean scores per HCAHPS measure, and 
we see slight support of the hypothesis that the introduction of the Patient Experience of 
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Care Domain in Hospital VBP led to a higher rate of improvement among participating 
providers that after the ACA had more to gain from improvement in this area.  
Acknowledging that the percentage scale in Figure 3 is defined by single percentage 
points (increments of .01), the VBP-participating group showed higher mean scores after 
five years in every HCAHPS measure except three, which all ended in draws.  The 
likelihood of these results being due to sampling error is quite low given the large sample 
sizes for both groups.  The results certainly move away from the “Is This A Hospital or A 
Hotel” article by Elisabeth Rosenthal that anecdotally cited massive provider shift 
towards hospitality over quality; the results point to very modest but apparent increased 
improvement in patient satisfaction scores among the providers participating in Hospital 
Value-Based Purchasing during FY2014. 
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Question 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Non-Participating Group Outcome Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – HVBP-Participating Group Outcome Scores 
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Figure 6 – Average Improvement in Outcomes Control vs. Experimental 
 
 
 If HCAHPS scores between provider groups appeared similar in July 2009, the 
Outcome scores for these same groups are virtually identical during that time.  There is 
extremely little 2009 variation in any of the Outcome measures, indicating even more 
emphatically than with HCAHPS that these providers, despite later splitting along 
participation and non-participation in Hospital VBP, exhibited virtually no differences in 
clinical outcome scores directly prior to the Affordable Care Act.   
 The improvement (or lack of) these Outcome scores over five years into 2014 is 
slightly more nuanced, and determined most directly by the Outcome metric being 
measured rather than participation in Hospital VBP.  Referring to Figure 6, we have the 
unexpected result of two out of six Outcome measures (Pneumonia 30-day mortality rate 
and Heart failure 30-day mortality rate) actually worsening over the five-year span rather 
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experimental groups.  In terms of better performance between the groups (Note: Unlike 
HCAHPS improvement a negative indicates improvement i.e. fewer 
deaths/readmissions), each group (VBP-participation vs. non-participation) either shows 
better improvement or a lesser decline than the other.  Again, the results in Figure 6 are 
most indicative of the specific Outcome measure trends that have improved versus the 
two that have not, which is perhaps indicative of overall population health rather than the 
presence of financial quality incentives affecting either group.   
 
Limitations 
 
 As will be discussed in the next section, this period of analysis is one of transition 
as hospitals make the switch to new quality incentives.  Given the relative infancy of this 
transition, it’s possible that certain results may not be generalizable to all providers 
moving forward.  After all, different hospitals and health systems are moving at different 
paces; priorities are diverse and it’s in many too early to tell which adaptations will yield 
the best competitive advantage.  
 Additionally, the experimental group (HVBP-participating) and control (no 
HVBP participation) are unequal in both size and composition.  The experimental group 
outnumbers the control by a factor of three, and due to eligibility requirements many 
providers in the control group did not have a choice in whether to opt in or not given that 
they are ineligible.  That being said, with both groups still containing a large number of 
observations (as well as HCAHPS and Outcomes being reported consistently for both 
groups regardless of HVBP participation) the comparisons still allow for meaningful 
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analyses in the purposes of this paper.  While no statistics are available on the percentage 
of the control group that is ineligible versus those who were eligible but had institutional 
prerogative to opt out, it is assumed that the majority of eligible providers opted into the 
program under the assumption that P4P is a trend that is only expanding and cementing 
itself in the landscape of American healthcare.  That being said, it is crucial that all 
providers regardless of VBP eligibility are on the hook for public reporting these 
measures (P4R), and consumer transparency is a driving force in its own right removed 
from quality reimbursement.  These comparisons remain relevant given that with the 
recent internalization of public reporting, all providers regardless of VBP eligibility are in 
a sense at the very least indirectly held accountable to a quality payment structure and 
incented to pursue quality improvement.     
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DISCUSSION 
 
 This analysis comes at a unique time in the landscape of healthcare payment 
reform.  Decades of pressure to move to capitation, enforceable quality metrics, and 
global budgeting are emerging in practice as a result of the Affordable Care Act. It is 
highly unlikely this trend, with all its inertia, will be reversed in the foreseeable future – 
such is the momentum of cost control and quality advocates alike.  As it stands, HVBP is 
the tip of the “pay for performance” iceberg.  The federal government (Congress, HHS, 
and CMS acting together) decided that this movement must include a patient’s experience 
of care, validating the patient-centered care movement and linking it directly with the 
shift towards evidenced-based medicine and accountability in outcomes.  It’s necessary to 
examine its impact in the present during this transition period, but also with a long-term 
eye on future implications as the program expands and embeds itself into balance sheets 
and industry culture. 
 As by far the largest payer in the U.S. healthcare market, Medicare is a uniquely 
equipped single payer with massive purchasing power to effectively delineate market 
conditions related to payment via reimbursement.  Its DRG (diagnosis-related group) 
payments represent the largest standardized fee schedule on the market, in effect granting 
CMS considerable leverage on provider behavior.  How much are providers on the hook 
for in this transition to quality incentive payments?  
 The results here point to several initial conclusions at the outset of this policy-
industrial shift.  These lessons, regardless of their longevity, serve as a foundation for 
future thinking about linking quality to payment   The first question raised by scholars, 
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policy analysts, and industry advocates in the wake of the inclusion of patient satisfaction 
into the definition of quality is does satisfaction bear any relationship to outcomes? The 
results in this analysis point to no.  With a slightly negative correlation between CMS-
adjusted “Patient Experience of Care” domain scores and similarly adjusted “Outcome” 
scores,6 there appears to be no relationship between these metrics as scored by HVBP.  
Does this validate critics’ claims that patient satisfaction has no business being regarded 
as an indicator of quality care?  Not quite.  On the one hand, it is noteworthy that the data 
suggests virtually no correlation between satisfaction and outcomes.  But the answers to 
Questions #2 and #3 do not indicate meaningful results that providers with skin in the 
game for patient satisfaction are diverging from a focus on quality improvement in 
clinical outcomes.  After all, outcome has its own domain in FY2014 and beyond – 
percentage-wise they are almost held almost just as accountable for Outcome Domain 
scores as they are Patient Experience of Care.  Few scholars addressed the possibility of 
harmonious balance between incentives that are more traditionally clinical and ensuring a 
high quality (though possible subjective) patient experience of their care.  Given the lack 
of consensus over patient satisfaction not being linked to good outcomes, coupled with 
the new financial incentives, providers may just as well conclude that the debate is moot 
at best.   
 It’s no secret that providers are adjusting to the new incentive structure including 
emphasizing and holding staff accountable for high marks on the HCAHPS.  While 
                                                
6 Despite not being a metric that is calculated into the HVBP Total Performance Score until 
FY2014 and beyond, the nonbinding scores are both reflected in FY2014 data and relevant for 
this analysis.   
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studying the impact of financial incentives for patient satisfaction is a work in progress, 
there has been conspicuous behavior on the part of providers responding to these 
incentives – no more visible than in the human resources department.  Specifically, the 
emergence of “Chief patient experience officers” or “CXO’s” indicates that certain 
hospitals with cultures of early adoption are making patient experience of care a 
management priority (Diana).  In an environment where all resources are zero-sum (and 
in light of the potential pitfalls in assessing a relationship between outcomes and 
satisfaction based on holistic categorical data) the purpose here was to explore whether 
such a push in the direction of satisfaction was/is being made at the expense of outcomes 
– again, the evidence does not support this notion.  We find no meaningful results in this 
analysis that indicate high patient satisfaction and good outcomes to be mutually 
exclusive, though as providers and their consultants adjust to the Hospital VBP program 
it will remain relevant to explore what practices providers are employing to maximize 
their scores/payments.    
  
 
Looking Ahead 
 
 Hospital VBP, while an important disruptor in the status quo of care delivery from 
the payment perspective, is not acting alone.  Since 2009, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA, also known as the “stimulus package”) allocated nearly 
twenty billion dollars in incentives for hospitals and medical practices to adopt electronic 
health record (EHR) and display “meaningful use” of that technology towards a 
prescribed set of ends including care coordination, patient safety such as drug 
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interactions, adherence to evidenced-based medicine (i.e. clinical processes of care), and  
other efficiency-related goals (Hospital Inpatient Value-Based Purchasing Program).   
 All industry indicators point to a continued push in the direction of value-based 
care, which would involve a higher percentage of provider reimbursement tied to quality 
measures as time goes on and more providers make the adjustment.  In these beginning 
stages, many providers find themselves of two minds: one towards innovation and 
adaptation to the value-based model, yet the other rooted firmly in the status quo 
incentives that remain fee-for-service.  Until financial stakes become higher (and recent 
transparency becomes more grounded in consumer behavior), the U.S. healthcare market 
will not be truly competitive on the basis of quality.  The experience of the patient will 
continue to be a salient aspect of this competition, and future research is warranted into 
the optimal balance between incentivizing patient satisfaction relative to the other quality 
metrics internalized by the healthcare industry.     
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A: THE RISE OF “PATIENT-CENTERED” CARE 
 
 To gain a better sense of context for the current emphasis on patient satisfaction 
as a quality metric, it’s helpful to understand its role as cog in the larger scheme of the 
movement towards “patient-centered care.” In the context of a movement towards quality 
and cost-effective care, it is not immediately clear or inevitable that patient satisfaction be 
a part of this transformation.  When we examine the antecedents of patient-centered care 
(that is, traditional care defined by professional sovereignty and fee-for-service), it is 
accepted fact that the patient in the most ironic sense had little to no agency in the 
delivery and receipt of their own healthcare.  This made sense for obvious reasons: How 
could a patient’s perspective be remotely relevant when paired with an extensively 
trained, well-respected clinical professional?  Moreover even if patients’ perspectives 
were considered relevant and supplementary to the opinion of the physician (they were 
not), there were no meaningful or direct financial incentives to solicit patients as partners 
in their care in the first place. A central tenet of Paul Starr’s canon work The Social 
Transformation of American Medicine (1984) documents the trajectory of the medical 
profession in the United States and in particular its uniquely maintained “professional 
sovereignty” – a societal value given to physicians by the public as medicine gradually 
progressed from glorified quackery to a true power to heal and improve health (Starr).  
Meticulously maintained by the medical profession, this sovereignty served as an 
effective shield from those seeking to change the status quo of professional autonomy 
and financial security from fee-for-service.  This powerful norm of medical sovereignty 
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effectively succeeded, until recently, in insulating physicians from outside questioning of 
their practices.  Ironically, the attrition of that norm was generated first from within the 
ranks of the medical profession.   
 In 2001, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released a groundbreaking report 
surveying the current quality of care in the United States (which was found to be much 
poorer and less safe than anyone thought) that has yielded industry-wide shifts in attitude 
and behavior since its publication over a decade ago.  Crossing the Quality Chasm: A 
New Health System for the 21st Century was instrumental not only due to the flaws in 
organization and structure it exposed and articulated, but its prescriptive elements that 
defined itself as an impetus for advocacy.  What made it a true call to action was the way 
in which it presented glaring problems with their solutions – clear, concise, and easily 
boiled down into six “aims for improvement:” safety (avoiding and eliminating 
unnecessary medical errors), effectiveness (adhering strictly to treatment that can benefit 
as opposed to treatment that is unnecessary, e.g. evidence-based medicine), timely 
(reducing wait times for those in need of care), efficient (eliminating waste), equity 
(addressing systemic inequality in access and provision of care), and finally care that is 
patient-centered – “providing care that is respectful of and responsive to individual 
patient preferences, needs, and values, and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical 
decision.” (IOM, 3).  Of its ten “Rules for Redesign” the first three all directly spoke to 
the concept of patient-centered care: 
 
1. Care is based on continuous healing relationships.  Patients should receive care 
whenever they need it and in many forms, not just face-to-face visits.  This implies 
that the health care system must be responsive at all times, and access to care 
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should be provided over the Internet, by telephone, and by other means in 
addition to in-person visits. 
 
2. Care is customized according to patient needs and values.  The system should be     
designed to meet the most common types of needs, but should have the capability 
to respond to individual patient choices and preferences.   
 
3. The patient is the source of control.  Patients should be given the necessary 
information and opportunity to exercise the degree of control they choose over 
health care decisions that affect them.  The system should be able to 
accommodate differences in patient preferences and encourage shared decision-
making.   
 
 (IOM, 1-3) 
 
 Dr. Donald Berwick, a renowned patient safety expert, former IOM delegate, and 
later Administrator of CMS under President Obama built upon the idea of patient-
centeredness and magnified calls for its attention in a piece published in May of 2009 – 
the height of a long legislative slog that characterized the drafting the Affordable Care 
Act.   In it he makes distinctions between “a consumerist view of the quality of care” over 
the “more classical, professionally dominated definitions of ‘quality’” and chooses to 
endorse the former (Berwick, 1).  He provides his own definition of patient-centered care 
(eight years after the IOM report made the idea mainstream): “The experience (to the 
extent the informed, individual patient desires it) of transparency, individualization, 
recognition, respect, dignity, and choice in all matters, without exception, related to one’s 
person, circumstances, and relationships in healthcare.”  
 Increasing professional internalization of patient-centered care evidenced by the 
two perspectives above has ensured an inevitability that patient satisfaction, the measure 
by which we empirically observe to what extent individuals generally feel that they are 
indeed a source of control in the delivery of their own care (more about the actual 
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methodology of the measure itself in a later section), is a relevant and necessary 
component of quality care.  A salient focus on patient satisfaction is surely associated 
with the patient-centered care movement, though other posited explanations for its rising 
popularity in scholarly attention could have been part of the more general consumerist 
movement, a maturation of the family medicine research agenda, or perhaps a byproduct 
of increased provider competitiveness stemming from the managed care movement which 
led provider networks to focus on new distinguishing quality factors in order to attract 
patients (Thiedke, 1).  On this last point, insurance companies (typically not characterized 
as “good” actors in perceptions of U.S. healthcare) have in many respects forged the path 
on quality incentivization compared to the federal government and many states.  None 
serves as a more prime example than Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, one of the 
Commonwealth’s leading private insurers, which in 2009 enacted its “Alternative Quality 
Contract” which combined global budgeting with significant opportunity for bonuses 
based on robust quality measure reporting that included patient satisfaction (Chernew et 
al.).  Given the regional leverage of Blue Cross Blue Shield as one of only a few major 
insurers in the market, private sector innovation was made possible and witnessed 
encouraging results in both quality improvement and cost reduction.  Given Medicare’s 
massive and exclusive economy of scale as a public single payer, government-led 
innovation in quality incentivization was a logical transition after this kind of well-
documented success in the private sector.  Returning to the oft-ill perception of insurance 
companies and their motivations, it stands to reason that if the incentives are structured 
  
37 
properly (i.e. those rewarding quality and transparency in care) the market, even one as 
convoluted as American healthcare, will subsequently reward good behavior.   
 This internalization of the importance of patient satisfaction as a meaningful part 
of patient-centeredness and quality care successfully embedded itself into federal public 
policy with Section 3001 of the Affordable Care Act establishing the Medicare Hospital 
Value-Based Purchasing Program, which has directly adopted patient satisfaction as not 
only a salient indicator of the quality of inpatient hospital care but also an aspect by 
which these providers are judged and ultimately awarded federal funding.   
 The values espoused by the IOM and later Dr. Berwick fly unabashedly in the 
face of decades, if not well over a century of precedent concerning the roles of physicians 
and patients in the systematic delivery of care in the United States.  This statement is in 
some ways misleading, because to say the patient had a “role” is to give credence to the 
supposition that historically the patient had any real agency at all – this was not the case.  
As the next section will discuss, the individual patient was little more than a passive 
recipient of the expert knowledge and decision making of physicians, who would have 
thought it downright inconceivable to transfer any portion of that decision making 
authority to a party outside the walls of the profession.  The third IOM rule of redesign is 
especially forceful in this direction – claiming without any qualifier that the patient is the 
primary and ultimate source of control in healthcare.  Berwick goes even further to posit 
patient choice in all matters “without exception” to be the norm of choice and necessity 
in modern healthcare.  As the IOM is composed entirely of leading physicians, these two 
similar interpretations about patient-centeredness represent a level and salience of 
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advocacy not typically seen in other areas of more visible elements of healthcare reform: 
advocacy from within the ranks of the medical profession. With the growth of managed 
care and increasing internalization of the patient-centered care and pay-for-performance 
movements within organized professional medicine, the political opportunity for more 
patient-oriented policy coincided with the Democratic electoral victories of 2006 and 
2008 that effectively guaranteed healthcare reform as a feasible policy goal.  
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APPENDIX B: PATIENT-PHYSICIAN COMMUNICATION AS AN 
ANTECEDENT TO PATIENT SATISFACTION  
 
 
 The scholarly focus from within professional medicine on patient-physician 
communication played a salient role in acknowledging the role of the patient and 
eventually became part of the patient-centered care movement.  Its status as a major 
determinant of patient satisfaction warrants further discussion here.  Thompson & Suñol 
(1995) chronicle these various perspectives presented by different authors in the 
discipline and present four categories of patient expectations:  
 
1) Ideal – Desires in outcomes of care   
 
2) Predicted – Involving desires, but closer to the more realistic anticipated outcome. 
 
3) Normative – What patients believe should happen, often based on physician counsel  
   but also socially produced.  
 
4) Unformed – When patients are unable or unwilling to articulate expectations due to  
   lack of knowledge or fear of expected outcomes.   
 
(Thompson & Suñol, 130-131) 
 
They go on to cite expectancy disconfirmation theory as a central underlying factor 
affecting each of these types of expectations – the idea that satisfaction in healthcare is 
the result of a cognitive comparison, a difference equation, between prior expectations of 
the outcome and perceived benefits of the care experience after the fact.  In this model, 
satisfaction occurs when this comparison results in a net positive, while dissatisfaction is 
when the cognitive equation is negative.  Notice that according to this model (which the 
authors acknowledge has received both affirmations and disavowals in the supporting 
literature) clinical outcomes are an important factor, but only relative to the baseline 
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desires and anticipated outcomes of the patient.  If true, it is in the physician’s interest 
from a satisfaction standpoint (and under HVBP-affected physicians, a financial 
standpoint) to be the sole source of prior expectations for the patient; only then do 
clinical outcomes and satisfaction align completely.  While this is likely impossible to 
produce in practice, the concept segues into an important source of satisfaction long 
given attention inside the ranks of the medical profession: physician-patient 
communication.  Aside from clinical outcomes, this is the area where physicians have the 
most individual agency with which to impact the satisfaction of their patients.      
 Physician-patient communication is a topic that has enjoyed extensive scholarly 
attention over several decades; its findings have formed the foundation for views on 
patient satisfaction as we know it in 2014.  The first forays into physician-patient 
interactions (later termed “patient-centered communication” or PCC by way of eventual 
inclusion into the patient-centered care movement) explored the interactions between 
physicians of various types and welcomed psychology into medicine.  Kaplan et al. 
(1989) pioneered an experimental study that articulated a holistic framework for 
physician-patient interaction and explored its relationship to patient satisfaction.  Using 
randomized trials of patients with different chronic illnesses, the authors concluded the 
existence of a meaningful relationship between the behavior between physicians and 
patients during an office visit and the subsequent health status of that patient (Kaplan et 
al.).  Other findings indicate that better quality of physician interpersonal skills increased 
medical outcomes due to increased patient adherence/compliance to medication regimens 
and other self-care activities post-care visit; moreover, patient satisfaction was a 
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mediating factor in the level of adherence gained though strong physician interpersonal 
communication (Bartlett et al.).  (Note: while not the focus of this paper patient 
adherence is an extremely salient factor in cost containment - lack of proper adherence on 
the part of the patient, especially those with chronic illnesses, precipitates avoidable 
emergency room visits).  Patient-centered communication (PCC), a natural terminology 
synthesis between patient-centered care and physician-patient communication, and 
includes a blend of normative and practical considerations about the relationship between 
doctor and patient and their impacts on ensuring quality care.  The four “communication 
domains” of PCC are as follows: the patient's perspective, the psychosocial context, 
shared understanding, and sharing power and responsibility (Epstein et al.).  A subset of 
PCC that has garnered recent attention is the sensitivity of physicians to patients’ 
religious, spiritual, and cultural attributes over the course of their treatment.  Research 
has discovered that only half of hospital inpatients desiring a religious/spiritual treatment 
discussion (41% of inpatients) with their physician received one (Williams et al.).  More 
importantly for our purposes, patients who did engage in discussions of a 
religious/spiritual nature with their physician, regardless of whether they reported a desire 
to have such a conversation, were more likely to rate their care at the highest level across 
four different measures of patient satisfaction (Williams et al.).  Whether physician 
attention to individual religious and spiritual patient considerations improves clinical 
quality on the merits is unclear, but it certainly appears to impact satisfaction.   
 Finally, an outdated yet relevant definition of patient satisfaction is the one 
historically viewed by the medical profession and especially in inpatient/surgical settings 
  
42 
– the notion that clinical quality of the outcome is the exclusive predictor of satisfaction 
level.  Before the attention shift to communication and other more psychologically 
involved factors in the doctor-patient relationship, outcomes stood alone as the measure 
of satisfaction.  And for good reason – it would seem logical that the better the health 
outcome caused by a care visit, the happier that patient in theory should be with the care 
received.  Though a wealth of evidence exists and has been presented that in fact many 
additional patient-related factors affect satisfaction, a study as recent as 2008 focusing on 
surgical procedures for severe lower-extremity injuries found that after two years 
satisfaction among patients was predicted far more by clinical measures such as function, 
pain, and even the presence of depression rather than any characteristic stemming from 
the patient (O’Toole et al.).  While a noteworthy result, survey methodology must also be 
kept in contest.  When the HCAHPS format is discussed in its own section, the maximum 
time frame post-discharge is a mere six weeks – helpful to keep in mind to stand in 
contrast to a far longer follow up period that could perhaps lend more weight to clinical 
outcome as predictors of satisfaction than in the shorter term.   
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Appendix C: HCAHPS METHODOLOGY & IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 Up to this point the discussion has included intellectual movement that 
precipitated the focus on patient satisfaction, the views on determinants and reliable 
predictors of satisfaction, as well as the debate around whether satisfaction is in fact an 
appropriate metric in the context of quality incentive programs, like the HVBP.  Much 
debate has ensued on how to best measure satisfaction in healthcare, ranging from the 
purely theoretical to various researchers and advocates endorsing specific standardized 
assessments.  For our purposes here, we’re less concerned with the methodological merits 
of various available types surveys in favor of the only assessment endorsed by Congress 
in the Affordable Care Act and used to calculate the score for the “Patient Experience of 
Care” domain in the Medicare HVBP – the HCAHPS. 
 The Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems 
(HCAHPS) touts itself as the first national, standardized, publicly reported survey of 
patients’ perspectives of hospital care (HCAHPS Fact Sheet).  Prior to the release of 
HCAHPS it was not uncommon for hospital and health systems to measure satisfaction 
and other quality measures internally, but HCAHPS provided a first of its kind 
standardization to patient satisfaction (HCAHPS Fact Sheet).  Fortunately for both 
research and consumer choice purposes, HCAHPS began publicly reporting on a national 
scale in 2008 – two years prior to the Affordable Care Act being signed into the law.   
These years prior to the ACA and Medicare HVBP can effectively serve as the control 
years, i.e. the years without the incentive structure introduced by HVBP (more on 
research methodology later).  Its goals are threefold:  
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1) Implement a standardized survey tool to facilitate meaningful consumer          
    comparisons between healthcare providers. 
 
2) Increase provider incentives to improve quality of care via regular public reporting    
    periods. 
 
3) Increase transparency and accountability of healthcare that in the hospital setting is  
    in multiple capacities supported by taxpayer dollars. 
 
 (HCAHPS Fact Sheet)  
 
In the few years since its release after a rigorous joint testing between CMS and the 
Agency for Health Research and Quality7 (abbreviated AHRQ – also under the umbrella 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), it’s been endorsed by the 
National Quality Forum and the federal Office of Management and Budget for public 
reporting purposes (HCAHPS Fact Sheet).  
What’s in the HCAHPS, then? Relevant for both informative purposes and later 
comparisons with literature on satisfaction theory are two major factors: content and 
administration methodology.  We’ll begin with the former. 
 The HCAHPS survey is composed of nine key topics: communication with 
doctors, communication with nurses, responsiveness of hospital staff, pain management, 
communication about medicines, discharge information, cleanliness of the hospital 
environment, quietness of the hospital environment, and transition of care. Followed by 
the core areas of performance are seven demographic questions (which are used by CMS 
to determine a “patient adjustment coefficient” that in theory create a level playing field 
for hospitals with higher proportions of at-risk patients). The survey is 32 questions in 
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length (HCAHPS Online).  The question core areas listed below along with their 
frequency: 
 
1) Communication with nurses (4 questions) 
2) Communication with doctors (3 questions) 
3) The responsiveness of the hospital staff (5 questions) 
4) The cleanliness of the hospital environment (1 question) 
5) The quietness of the hospital environment (1 question) 
6)  Pain management (3 total, 2 conditional) 
7)  Communication about medicines (3 total, 2 conditional) 
8)  Discharge information (3 total, 2 conditional) 
9) An overall global rating of the hospital (1 question, Scale 1-10111) 
10) Would they recommend the hospital to others (1 question, Yes or No) 
11) Demographics (7 questions, all non-performance related) 
 
 
 After much theoretical discourse from a diverse set of authors over time, the 
HCAHPS core topic areas simultaneously allow and warrant a discussion about the 
specific priorities, methodological choices, weighting, and exclusions reflected in the 
survey.8  Foremost among observations of the distribution in question topic is the 
concentration of categories that involve system actors that are not physicians.  Nurses are 
by far the most prominent group from an HCAHPS perspective, though they are joined 
by more ancillary hospital maintenance staff.  Even measures that imply the role of a 
doctor such as pain management, communication about medicines, and discharge 
information (which perhaps is the most direct link to clinical outcomes via improved 
compliance) may not in fact directly involve a doctor.  Increasingly, these traditionally 
                                                
8 For a comprehensive analysis of HCAHPS tradeoffs, see the Abt Associates report 
commissioned by CMS (2005): https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-
Assessment-Instruments/HospitalQualityInits/Downloads/HCAHPSCostsBenefits200512.pdf 
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physician-dominated care functions are being filled by nurses (Donelan et al. 2013) 
including many states loosening professional restrictions on support staff such as 
physician assistants (Beck).   
 Through personal conversations with hospital administrators who are on the hook 
for HCAHPS reporting as well as HVBP, this methodology lends itself to rigorous staff 
management when it comes to maintaining high scores.  Because the inpatient hospital 
settings lends itself far more to patient-staff interaction falling outside of the physician-
patient relationship, factors like cleanliness quiet levels become administrative priorities 
that do not necessarily come within the purview of medicine.  Returning to the academic 
debate over satisfaction now that we’re presented with concrete application of patient 
satisfaction in a nationally standardized survey, these arguably non-clinical factors can be 
cause for concern.  The rebuttal however, again both through personal conversations as 
well as scholarship, is an argument in favor of holding providers accountable to these 
measures.  The measures are justified by the finding that the more enthusiastic, happy, 
and team-oriented hospital staffs are associated with better clinical outcomes in their 
hospitals (“Positive Practice Environments”).  Regardless of the validity or relevance of 
the survey topics, HCAHPS has won a mandate in Medicare and acts as the sole 
meaningful measure of patient satisfaction in the HVBP. 
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APPENDIX D: Hospital VBP Eligibility Requirements   
 
 
 The eligibility criteria includes only those hospitals that can be paid through the 
inpatient prospective payment system under Medicare and meet the additional eligibility 
criteria listed under Section 3001c of the Affordable Care Act. According to CMS, More 
than 3,000 hospitals across the country are eligible to participate in Hospital HVBP.  The 
program applies to subsection (d) hospitals located in the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia and acute-care hospitals in Maryland (FAQ – Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing Program).   A summary of ineligible hospitals are listed below followed by 
general eligibility criteria for reference: 
 
 
Ineligible Providers (excluded from HVBP, HCAHPS reporting optional): 
 
• Critical access hospitals 
• Children’s hospitals 
• VA hospitals 
• Long-term care facilities 
• Psychiatric hospitals 
• Rehabilitation Hospitals 
• Hospitals cited by the Secretary of HHS for deficiencies during the performance 
period that pose an immediate jeopardy to patients’ health or safety 
• Hospitals that do not meet the minimum number of cases, measures, or surveys 
required by the Hospital HVBP  
 
General Methodological Eligibility for Subsection (d) Hospitals: 
 
• The Clinical Process of Care domain requires four or more measures, each with at 
least 10 cases. 
• The Patient Experience of Care domain requires at least 100 HCAHPS surveys in 
the performance period.  
• The Outcome domain in FY 2013 requires two or more mortality measures, each 
with at least 10 cases. In FY 2014, the minimum cases for the mortality measures 
changes to 25 cases. PSI-90 will require 3 cases as a minimum for any of the 
underlying indications. CLABSI will require the hospital to have at least one 
predicted infection during the applicable period. 
• The Efficiency domain will require 25 cases for the Medicare Spending per 
Beneficiary measure.   
• To be included in VBP, the hospital must meet these criteria for all domains. 
 
 
 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) 
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